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The modest Progress of Arab Integration, or why some Arab 
Countries have integrated more with Europe than with their 
Neighbours 
 
Dr. Wolfgang Zank, Associate Professor, Aalborg University 
 
 
Abstract  
In this paper I explore the reasons why there has been comparatively little 
progress at Arab integration after 1945. At first glance this outcome might seem 
paradoxical because cultural factors, to which some scholars attribute a high 
importance for the progress towards integration, seemed strongly to favour Arab 
integration. The existence of a common Arab group-feeling, common language, 
common religion and the common experience of colonialism are to be 
mentioned in this context.  
 
The low degree of Arab integration cannot be explained by just one theory or 
model. Various factors had a different impact at different points in time. 
Therefore the text contains on the one hand a narrative of historical 
developments in the different periods, and on the other hand a theoretical 
discussion of the factors working in these periods. As it turns out, structural 
internal factors (the character of the political regimes and the socio-economic 
systems) created path dependencies which for a long time worked against more 
integration. Once these structural features were in place, many important 
decisions could then be explained by rational-choice models.  
 
Political antagonisms between Arab countries have abated considerably, and the 
socio-economic systems have become much more open than before. These 
developments have improved the conditions for integration considerably. In 
particular the initiatives towards a Greater Arab Free Trade Area can be 
mentioned in this context. However, there seems to be a much stronger trend 
towards integration with the EU-countries, economic, but in some first instances 
also political integration. The big EU market has been practically open for the 
Arab countries for a long time and worked therefore as a kind of economic 
magnet. In addition, the EU has developed a rather consistent policy of 
economic integration, practical cooperation and network building with the 
countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Not the least 
the policy of giving these countries a “stake in EUs internal market” has the 
potential of creating important political spill-over effects. 
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Introduction: A low degree of integration in spite of a seemingly high 
degree of cultural commonness 
Some decades ago Arab nationalism seemed to be a formidable force, and 
numerous intellectuals in the region dreamt of the creation of one big nation 
“from the Atlantic to the Gulf.” But most projects at Arab integration turned out 
to be non-starters.  
 
It would be wrong to state that there has been no progress at all at Arab 
integration. The Arab League, founded in 1945 by seven states, comprises by 
now 22 countries, and it has not been without effects. It created a regular forum 
for deliberations of the Arab leaders, and at times they were able to formulate 
common positions on important issues, for instance the Arab Peace Initiative of 
2002. There are also numerous sub-organizations such as an Arab Monetary 
Fund, a General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture for 
Arab Countries, or an International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions. These 
institutions can at least contribute to a common socialization at elite level. The 
League has also been assisting at cultural exchange, at shaping Arabic school 
curricula, preserving old manuscripts or translating modern technological 
terminology. In 1997 under the auspices of the League the program of a Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) was set in motion, and it brought about 
important rounds of tariff reductions among the member states (albeit only of 
the type of “shallow integration”, see below). There is also considerable cross-
border labour migration, from the non-oil states to the oil-rich countries. The 
remittances of the migrants became an important source of income for some 
Arab countries.1 TV stations such as Al-Jazeera have a pan-Arabic audience, and 
so do some journals. 
 
However, all this is much less than hoped for in the heydays of Pan-Arabism. 
And also in comparison with other regions, the Arab world is surprisingly non-
integrated. The Arab League has remained a strictly intergovernmental 
organization. Unlike the European Union, there are no mechanisms for creating 
supranational legislation, nor is there a court of justice with the power to 
produce binding decisions. An in an overall view of the decades after 1945, 
harsh confrontations, including numerous armed conflicts, have been more 
characteristic for the Arab states than common actions, let alone integration. 
And in the economic sphere the Arab states have traded with the world at large, 
mainly oil and gas, but hardly among each other. Trade within the region 
accounts for only 5 percent of the GDP of the countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA); total trade openness of the region lies at only 8 per cent 
                                                          
1  By 1999, workers’ remittances were as high as 18 or 21 percent of GDP (Yemen, Jordan), 
6 percent in Morocco, 4 percent in Egypt and Tunisia and 2 percent in Algeria. However, 
the figures for the Maghreb countries include also remittances from Europe, mainly 
France (Fawzy, 19) and are therefore indicative not only of inter-Arab migrations. 
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of GDP (ECB 2004, 69). This makes the Arab world one of the least integrated 
regions in economic terms, similar in this respect to Sub-Saharan Africa (safe 
Southern Africa). By contrast, the countries of East Asia, having no League and 
no history of “Pan-Eastasianism” have highly integrated economies by now. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the low degree of Arab integration might look 
surprising at first glance. After all, when the Arab League was founded in 1945, 
the member states shared a common language and a common religious heritage. 
At elite level and among  large sections of the population there was a 
pronounced pan-Arab “we-feeling” (Kramer, 182). Many scholars of integration 
have attach a high importance to cultural factors such as these and recurred, for 
instance, to a common European identity as the main factor behind the eastern 
enlargement of the EU.2. But not the least the Arab experience shows in my 
view: Factors such as language or common identity do not bring about 
integration. They might be helpful, but they become secondary in the face of 
structures and of interests created by them. In this paper I will explain this 
position in more detail. 
  
More specifically, I will give an historical overview over the development of 
efforts at Arab integration. At important junctions I then try to interpret the 
outcomes in the light of theoretical models which often are used in integration 
studies. It is my position that not one theory can explain the whole development, 
instead different models turn out to be relevant at different points in time. Not 
the least the choice of political regimes and of socio-economic structures played 
an important role because they unleashed far-ranging structural dynamics, often 
unintended. In the last decades, a slow process of economic convergence and 
openness and the lower degree of political antagonism between the political 
regimes in the Arab world have actually improved the prospects of Arab 
integration to some extent, economically and politically.3 Progress, however, 
takes place mainly with smaller sub-groupings of the Arab World, most so in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. 
  
                                                          
2  Erroneously, as I think (Zank 2005, in particular 49-54). 
3  As regards the terminology: I speak of cooperation when independent units cooperate 
without giving up their independence. Integration takes place when cooperation involves 
structural changes which make the units mutually dependent. Today economic integration 
is widespread, most countries are economically dependent upon each other; but the degree 
is different. Political integration takes when decision-making processes become 
interdependent. A weak form of political integration is the construction of an 
intergovernmental organization which implies at least common deliberations and thereby 
some extent of common socialization. Strong integration takes place when a supranational 
level above the states with important competences emerges 
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In order to understand the developments after the foundation of the Arab 
League, we have to go back to the decades before 1945. 
  
 
The Rise of Pan-Arabism and the Founding of the Arab League 
“Awake, O Arabs, and arise!” wrote the poet Ibrahim al-Yaziji in 1868, perhaps 
the first significant expression of an Arab “awakening”, i.e. a nationalist 
movement among the Arabs under Ottoman rule. An important source seems to 
have been the discontent among Arab-speaking elite Muslims who felt 
discriminated against when it came to government positions in the Ottoman 
institutions (Kramer, 171-6). They started demanding autonomy and resisted 
Turkification and the use of Turkish at the expense of other languages such as 
Arabic. Conflicts of this kind arose also many places in Europe or e.g. in India. 
This can be explained if, as Eric J. Hobsbawm has put it, “we see the vernacular 
language as, among other things, a vested interest of the lesser examination-
passing classes” (Hobsbawm, 118). Also the beginning of Zionist immigration 
to Palestine contributed at politicizing Arab circles. Interestingly, a movement of 
Arab literary revival, not necessarily translating into political nationalism, but 
indirectly supporting it by spreading pride about Arabic, owed much to the 
efforts of Arab-speaking Christian minorities who were interested in a medium 
for missionary work and modern learning (Kramer, 175). 
  
As political force, Arab nationalism remained weak before 1914. But the Great 
War, which profoundly changed everything, changed also this, not the least by 
firing ideological emotions up to unprecedented heights. In 1916 the British 
concluded an alliance with a local Arab ruler, Sharif Husein of Hejaz, who rose 
in revolt against Ottoman rule, the promised price being a large Arab kingdom. 
His sons Faysal and Abdullah established contacts with nationalist circles in 
Damascus and could recruit Arab officers from the Ottoman army. When the 
Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1918, triumph seemed near, and Faysal formed an 
“Arab Government” in Damascus. In 1920 he let himself proclaim monarch of a 
“United Kingdom of Syria” which contained the whole Levant. His brother 
Abdullah was proclaimed king of Iraq. 
  
But already during the war Great Britain and France had secretly decided 
otherwise (Sykes-Picot Agreement). The final details were 1920 settled at a 
conference in San Remo, and in accordance with these decisions French forces 
conquered Damascus and established a French Mandate Rule (Syria and 
Lebanon), whereas Palestine and Iraq became British mandatory territories. The 
British showed some flexibility towards their former Arab allies and in 1921 
made Faysal king of an extended Iraq, of course under their supervision, 
whereas Abdullah received “Transjordan”, a piece cut off from Palestine where 
Jewish immigration became interdicted. But flexibility or not, seen from the 
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point of view of Arab nationalists, British and French policies were nothing but 
perfidy. Arab nationalism got a new and uniting enemy, the West. Numerous 
rebellions erupted throughout the Arab world in the 1920s and 1930s, from Iraq 
to Morocco, ruthlessly repressed everywhere, most so presumably in Libya, 
where Fascist Italy used poison gas in huge quantities and held large sections of 
the population in concentration camps; also Spanish troops used poison gas 
against Abd-el Krim in Morocco (Mattioli, 317-9).  
  
There was thus much food for Arab rage, and with the spread of education and 
the Arabic press, Pan-Arabism gained immensely in popularity and conquered a 
solid place in public discourse. Pan-Arabism also spread geographically. 
Previously few Egyptians saw themselves as Arabs, nor did the Arab nationalists 
before 1914 do so. In the Maghreb where many people spoke Berber, resistance 
against colonial rule was originally under the banner of Islam. But the common 
experience of European colonialism made it possible to create symbolic bonds 
between Algerians and Syrians (Kramer, 182). Under the often humiliating 
conditions of foreign domination the idea of a great Arab nation with a glorious 
past and therefore entitled to a likewise glorious future, could restore pride, 
“from the ocean to the gulf”. And making the Arabs unite seemed to be the way 
forward to independence.  
  
The Arab world gained independence, but not united. One by one independent 
Arab states emerged (Yemen being the first one, with de facto independence in 
1918 and international recognition in 1920). Some of these new states have been 
political communities for a long time, for instance Egypt. But others such as 
Lebanon, Syria or Iraq were political artifacts whose borders were drawn by the 
colonial powers. But artifacts or not, with the exception of Lebanon they turned 
out to be rather resilient creations.  
  
By 1944 seven states had practically (with some infringements of sovereignty 
such as the British rights in the Suez Canal Zone) gained independence: Egypt, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen. In Alexandria on 
25 September they opened formal negotiations, seemingly with the purpose to 
give practical meaning to the cause of Arab unity. And on 22 March 1945 they 
signed the Charta of the Arab League. At first sight this might have looked like a 
first important step towards unity. But in fact it was a “victory for sovereignty” 
(Barnett and Solingen, 190). Earlier drafts had contained ideas of e.g. a 
collective security system, institutionalized military cooperation or development 
of a common foreign policy, but in the course of negotiations all these points, in 
fact every hint at arrangements which could restrict state sovereignty, became 
carefully discarded. Instead the Charta explicitly demanded “respect for the 
independence and sovereignty of these states.” All in all, the League “was not 
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intended to promote anything more than functional cooperation” (Barnett and 
Solingen, 192). 
  
But the Arab leaders made some symbolic concessions to the cause of Arab 
unity. This was not completely without consequences. After all, the very 
creation of the Arab League confirmed and strengthened the notion of the 
commonness of the Arabs, and rhetorically the leaders conceded that they had to 
foster the Arab cause. This implied some restrictions on their policy. But it 
remained completely undefined what it meant to foster the Arab cause, this was 
open to all kinds of interpretation. In this sense the Arab leaders did not bind 
their hands very much by their rhetoric commitments.4 And they knew already 
before they signed the Charta that they had to appear to be “good Arabs” 
because by then Arab nationalism was strong at home among the educated elites 
and the population at large. Being viewed as a “bad Arab” could imply a loss of 
political legitimacy. Quite logically, the ruling elites, wanting to guard their 
sovereignty, choose a solution where they made symbolic concessions to Pan-
Arabism and created a League, while at the same time carefully taking care for 
that this League did not gain competencies which could infringe their power.  
  
To sum this point up, we saw the rise of an influential nationalist ideological 
current, provoked by threats to cultural heritages and by foreign domination 
which actually made previously disparate currents unite. Ruling elites had to 
take this ideological current into account. But they did so almost exclusively 
symbolically. This can be explained by simple rational choice of self-interested 
national elites who wanted to preserve their power positions.  
  
We can also go one step back and add a perspective in the optics of Historical 
Institutionalism: When the independent Arab states where created, with most 
boundaries drawn by the imperialist powers, state institutions were created 
within the borders of these states. With independence the ruling elites got a 
vested interest in preserving these state-bound power structures. The states, 
however artificially they were created, remained for the coming decades rather 
stable constellations, with very few border changes. We can see this 
development as a case of “path dependency”: The decisions taken at the time of 
                                                          
4  I therefore cannot quite follow Barnett and Solingen when they write that the ”norms of 
Arabism” imposed ”greater constraints on their foreign policy” (p. 194).  There were no 
”norms of Arabism” except a diffuse expectation that Arab leaders had to work for unity 
and ought not collaborate with common enemies, or rather, not to do it openly. In 
practice, it meant that Arab leaders had to keep a symbolic distance to Israel. But it did 
not imply any obligation to go to war with Israel (these were free choices), nor did it 
imply assisting Arab states fighting with Israel effectively. It neither implied confronting 
the USA which have backed Israel all the time. The point that some Arab leaders such as 
Nasser tried to sell the message that ”Arabism” meant confronting the US did not mean 
that this was part of a common Arab understanding. 
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creating these states shaped developments and restricted choices for a long time 
to come. 
  
However, there were three factors over time which could have started dynamics 
towards closer integration: The Arab League institutionalized regular 
deliberations, which in other cases have led to a convergence of views. 
Furthermore, the Arab League created among other things a Secretariat and 
thereby a new political actor who could have worked as a catalyst for more 
integration. And last not least, functional cooperation has had in many other 
cases created “spill-overs”, not the least in the European Union, and thereby 
reinforced an integrationist drive. But in the Arab case, for many years to come 
a convergence of political views did not take place, rather on the contrary. The 
central institutions of the League were not able to start significant initiatives. 
Nor did functional cooperation gain importance; very few, if any, “spill-overs” 
came about. We will examine in more detail why this has been the case.  
 
 
The First Great Test: The War of 1948/49 
On 29 November 1947 the United Nations passed a resolution which provided 
for the division of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state.  Widespread 
fighting between Israelis and Palestine and Arab irregulars followed. Israel 
declared independence on14 May 1948, on the basis of the UN resolution, but 
one day later the member states of the Arab League issued a declaration that 
they did not accept the division of Palestine, the only solution being a unitary 
Palestinian State, “ where minorities will be assured of all the guarantees 
recognized in democratic constitutional countries”. Their declaration stated 
further that Zionist aggression had resulted in the exodus of more than a quarter 
of a million people; security and order in Palestine have become disrupted. 
Simultaneously troops of the Arab countries crossed the borders of Palestine. 
The Arab League had also established a common military high command and 
drafted a plan for the common invasion. At first glance, this looked like 
impressive collective action for a common cause. And close military 
cooperation could also have paved the way towards some political integration, 
for instance by creating common permanent institutions. 
  
However, things developed in a completely different direction. As Avi Shlaim 
put it: “Each Arab state was moved by its own dynastic or national interest … 
The Arab coalition was one of the most divided, disorganized and ramshackle 
coalitions in the entire history of warfare” (Shlaim, 82).  
  
To begin with, the Arab “Headquarter” under the Iraqi General Nur-al-Din 
Mahmud had no control over the forces on the ground. Nor did the Arab armies 
move in accordance with the common war plan. This plan was drafted on the 
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assumption that the states would employ the full strength of their armies, but in 
practice they only sent comparatively small expeditionary forces. The Israeli 
side had actually more soldiers in every phase of the war. During the first weeks, 
critical for Israel, the Arabs had more military hardware at disposition. But this 
changed during the first armistice period, which the Israeli used effectively for 
shipping heavy weapons to the country and for training and regrouping, whereas 
the Arab side remained mainly inactive. When Egypt re-opened hostilities on 8 
July, the Israelis outgunned their adversaries, and they did so for the rest of the 
war (Shlaim, 80f and 94). Due to the lack of coordination, the Arab troops had 
usually to move very cautiously, in order not to expose their flanks and risk 
being cut-off when advancing too far. In the last phases of the war the Israelis 
could concentrate forces and defeat their enemies one by one. After all, the 
outcome of the war was less of a miracle than sometimes depicted. 
  
The member states of the Arab League had substantially diverging war aims. 
King Abdullah was actually not against a partition of Palestine, provided that he 
could annex the Arab part of the West Bank. He had made a deal with the 
Jewish Agency in this respect before the war, which, however, did not cover 
Jerusalem (Shlaim, 84) But when partition date came nearer, the popular 
pressure for the “liberation of Palestine” seemed to be overwhelming, Abdullah 
could not risk not going formally along with the others. He sent his Arab 
Legion, the most professional of the Arab forces, under the leadership of British 
officers, across the Jordan, but certainly not for the “liberation of the 
Palestinians”. In and around Jerusalem some of the bloodiest battles of the war 
occurred when the Arab Legion took and secured the city for Abdullah and 
repulsed heavy Israeli attacks. It looked as if Israel and Transjordan were the 
worst of enemies, but then for the rest of the war they became the “best of 
enemies”, as the Israeli writer Uri Bar Joseph put it, the Arab Legion fighting 
only when attacked.  
  
Syria and Lebanon regarded Abdullah with utmost suspicion because they saw 
him as a threat to their independence; Abdullah entertained some ideas of a 
“Greater Syria”, with himself as the king of it. And Egypt’s King Farouq saw 
Abdullah as a rival for leadership in the Arab world. It was in order to counter 
Abdullah’s annexation plans that the other League members under Egypt’s 
initiative installed an Arab government for the whole of Palestine, seated in 
Gaza. Abdullah reacted by letting his Arab Legion forcefully disband the 
Palestinian irregulars of the Holy War Army.  
  
Israeli forces broke the truce on 15 October in order to drive the Egyptians out 
of the Negev. They captured various towns and encircled an Egyptian brigade, 
in its ranks Major Gamal Abd-el Nasser. Transjordan remained neutral. General 
John B. Glubb, the commander of Transjordan’s Arab Legion, expressed the 
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hope that the Jewish offensive “may finally knock out the Gaza government and 
give the gyppies a lesson!” And: “The gyppies and the Gaza government are 
almost as hostile to us as the Jews!” (Shlaim, 98f). And when Israeli forces once 
again broke the truce on 22 December and stroke at the Egyptian forces, Cairo 
asked her Arab allies for help. Some did not seem to hear it. Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen promised help but did not do so in practice. Humiliated, 
Egypt had to ask for armistice negotiations which became effective on 7 January 
1949 and ended this war. 
  
All in all, the war of 1948/49 was the first big test of Arab unity. It failed 
dismally. Pan-Arab ideology was powerful enough to press reluctant politicians 
such as Abdullah seemingly to join a common front against Israel. But he did 
not want to destroy Israel; his interest was to secure for himself the West Bank 
with Jerusalem(which he formally annexed in April 1950).  Solidarity with the 
Palestinians, allegedly the reason for the joint invasion, is not to be found in 
practice, Palestinians were interesting only when they could be used as pawns. 
As the main force of the Arab side we see the self-interest of ruling elites, trying 
to maximize territory and/or influence. Most of them lost the war whereas 
Abdullah and Israel were the winners.  
  
Theoretical models of “prisoners’ dilemma and the like, i.e. problems of 
collective actions of rational self-interested actors under conditions of lack of 
trust and incomplete information, can explain the policy of the Arab countries. 
Rhetoric statements about Arab solidarity and Palestinian liberation were 
symbolic concessions to a widespread ideological current, but with very little, if 
any, political impact.  
 
 
Sundry schemes of Arab unification and the United Arab Republic of 1958 
As even die-hard Pan-Arabists realized, there was no realistic hope for 
unification of all Arab states in the near future. But was it not possible that 
smaller subgroups united, perhaps as a first step for a more comprehensive 
unification? Indeed numerous schemes for unification of states were designed: 
“Fertile Crescent Unity”, “Greater Syria”, “Arab Federation”. In particular in the 
Fertile Crescent with its “states created without reason” (Kramer 183) ideas of 
this kind proliferated. But when turned into practical proposals they were 
hardly-disguised schemes for self-aggrandizement where one government 
wanted to use Pan-Arab sentiments for its own purposes. But these proposals 
were of no interest for the elites in the smaller states which were supposed to be 
swallowed And given the point that a merger of one or more states meant a loss 
of relative power for the other Arab states, these usually worked against 
unification schemes - not always in an open way because that would have cost 
legitimacy in the eyes of Arab audiences, but then in a hidden but nevertheless 
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efficient way, as e.g. Egypt did when the Iraqi government proposed a merger 
with Syria. An important role in these power games played the scheme of an 
Arab collective-security treaty, again a concession to Pan-Arab sentiments, 
which then, however, did not become implemented  (Barnett and Solingen, 198-
201). 
  
In theoretical terms, we can again interpret this type of political games in terms 
of simple rational choice of national elites who make some symbolical 
concessions to ideological currents or try to exploit them for their own interests. 
In this view “non-unification” is just the normal outcome. 
 
However, there was actually one example of unification, namely the creation of 
the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria in 1958. How can this “anomaly” 
be explained? In this context a model developed by William Riker becomes very 
useful. He emphasized the importance of external threats when it comes to the 
creation of federations.  But before we discuss this theoretically, we will have a 
closer look at the historical emergence of the union between Egypt and Syria. 
  
  
In Egypt by February-March 1954 Gamal Abd-el Nasser could decide the power 
struggles after the military coup of 1952 in his favour, to dominate Egyptian 
political life until his death in 1970. As we shall see below, in practical terms 
Nasser’s policies proved to be extremely divisive for the Arab world. But on the 
rhetorical plan he became one of the most vocal proponents of Pan-Arabism. 
Having no democratic nor traditional nor religious legitimacy, he endeavoured 
to gain political legitimacy by profiling himself as a champion of “social justice” 
in the form of “Arab socialism” (see below) and as a fighter for the realization 
of nationalist aspirations – firstly mainly Egyptian nationalism, then increasingly 
Pan-Arabism. And for some years Nasser was extremely successful at this. 
Aptly he played the great powers off one against each other. When the US 
refused to finance the Aswan Dam, Nasser received financing from the Soviet 
Union and China. And when, due to his support for the Algerian guerrillas and 
the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Great Britain, France and Israel attacked 
Egypt in November 1956, the United States came to his rescue (Kramer, 186). 
  
In 1956 he emerged seemingly victorious against Israel and the biggest two 
colonial powers under whom the Arabs had suffered so much (and still did so by 
this time in Algeria). At last, here seemed to be a politician who could restore 
the dignity of the Arab masses, previously so often humiliated by Western 
powers and Zionists. Nasser could use his enormous prestige in order to 
mobilize the streets in other Arab capitals and thereby putting pressure on other 
governments. 
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Under the perception of an Israeli threat, Egypt and Syria concluded a pact of 
mutual defence in October 1955. Unlike the collective-security treaty of the 
Arab League of 1950, this one became partially implemented. Under the British-
French-Israeli attack in November 1956 Nasser could use Syrian bases to 
disperse his fighter planes, and in October 1957 two Egyptian battalions were 
flown to Latakia, Syria, when tensions at the Syrian-Turkish border increased. 
Also agreements on economic or cultural cooperation were concluded. By that 
time in Syria the influence of the Baath party was rapidly rising, not the least 
within the army. Its program called for socialism, Arab unification and 
“democracy”. Syria was formally a parliamentary republic, but behind the 
scenes the army stood for the major decisions. In 1955 the Baath party could 
purge ring-wing officers from the army, but was still not strong enough to push 
for socialism (Etzioni, 99-101). 
  
The Baath party acted in an alliance with the Communists. By the end of 1957 
the Baath leadership, regarding itself to be the stronger force, all of a sudden 
realized that the Communist party had more members, and that the communist 
influence in the army was almost equal to their own. Against this background, 
the Baath party advanced the slogan of “unity now”. In January 1958, a 
delegation of army officers and politicians flew to Cairo and offered unification 
to Nasser. He accepted under two conditions: The union should be a unitary 
state and not a federation, and political parties should be abolished. The Syrian 
side accepted. On February 1958 the Syrian population overwhelmingly 
endorsed the union and Nasser as its president. Allegedly, 1,312,759 persons 
voted “yes” and only 39 “no” (Etzioni, 108). The union was declared to be the 
first step towards comprehensive Arab unity. Enthusiastic Nasserists dominated 
the streets in many Arab capitals, their rulers had reason for serious worries. 
Pan-Arabism seemed to be unstoppable. 
  
But soon the union between Egypt and Syria ran into difficulties. Stepwise 
Nasser established direct rule over Syria; in October 1959 he made the Egyptian 
Field-Marshall Abd al-Hakim Amer governor of Syria, with unlimited authority 
and reporting directly to him. The “Egyptians ran Syria like a colony – and a 
badly run colony at that” (Kramer, 187). At the time of forging the union,  
Egypt’s march towards Arab socialism (see below) was well advanced, and 
several measures were taken to export it to the still pluralistic Syria with its by 
then rather open market economy. Capital fled the country and was illegally 
transferred to Lebanese and European banks. The import of “luxury items” such 
as washing machines, heaters, refrigerators and cars were forbidden. And 
experiments with land reform restricted the amount of land which an individual 
could own. This did not improve the lot of many Syrian peasants, but it was 
enough to make most land-lords abandon long-term investments. Opposition 
against Egyptian rule mounted (Etzioni, 114-17 and 131). 
 12
On January 1961, a group of seven Syrian army officers, all members of 
prominent families from Damascus, started planning a coup which they 
successfully carried out on 28 September. A Supreme Arab Revolutionary 
Command took control and declared they wanted to restore “freedom and 
dignity” to the Syrian people. Nasser decided not to try to suppress the coup by 
force. As he said: “Unity cannot be protected by force” (Etzioni, 120). 
  
From time to time new schemes for unification came up, until the 1970s: Iraq 
with Jordan, Egypt with Libya, Egypt with Sudan. None of them came any 
where near realization.  
  
The United Arab Republic of 1958 stands out as an exception; a union was 
indeed realized for some time. This can perhaps best be explained in the light of 
federalist theory, as pioneered by William Riker.5 Given the point that 
“federalism” often is seen only as a set of normative statements in favour of 
integration and consequently labelled as “pre-theory”, it should perhaps be 
emphasized that there also exists a normal academic explicative theory of 
federalism. Riker, coming from the Realist School in International Relations, 
wondered why there are examples of voluntary federations at all. This implied, 
after all, the voluntary loss of sovereignty, something near impossible for 
Realists. He saw the solution of the puzzle in threats which were so substantial 
that they could make it advisable to rational self-interested elites to accept a 
federation. This constellation we found indeed on the Syrian side, exposed to an 
external threat from Israel and an internal one from the Communists. Riker’s 
theory was criticized for not having specified the character of the threat 
sufficiently. And Social Constructivists might rightly argue that the magnitude 
of threats is in the eye of the beholder. But this objection does not devaluate 
Riker’s basic points, namely that states usually do not federate because of the 
implied loss of sovereignty, and that they do so only if the ruling elites conclude 
that a “federalist deal” is in their advantage. The Syrian elite did so in 1957/8, 
and given the widespread appeal of Pan-Arabism and Nasser’s high prestige, 
they could make the Syrian population accept the deal. Pan-Arabist ideology, in 
general of little practical impact on the actions of governments, could in this 
concrete situation assist at getting an elite decision to be implemented. 
  
However, in order to understand why the union did not last, we have to look at 
internal conditions. One important point has been the absence of a democratic 
constitution and rule by law. Under these conditions federations are prone to 
degenerate into a system where the strongest group dominates the others. This 
could also be seen in e.g. Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. Under these 
conditions perceptions of “us” versus “the others” re-emerge and pave the 
                                                          
5  A very useful overview can be found in McKay, 15-36. 
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ground for secessionism. But we have also to look at socio-economic structures. 
Syria and Egypt were very different in this respect, and this induced massive and 
un-wanted economic and social burdens on Syrian society, thus creating another 
important factor for secessionism. In the case of Syria secessionism was 
relatively easy, giving the strong position of the secessionists in the armed 
forces, and the geographic distance to Egypt. Furthermore, Nasser would have 
seriously shaken his prestige among Arab audiences, had he ordered a military 
repression of the Syrian secession   
  
Neo-functionalist theorists have often highlighted the importance of similar 
political-constitutional structures and similar socio-economic systems for the 
success of integration schemes. The abortive United Arab Republic vindicates 
this perspective: It failed because these conditions were not in place. 
  
We can expand on this argument: After the erection of revolutionary military 
rule and the introduction of schemes of Arab socialism in some countries, there 
was actually hardly any region in the world which had more adverse conditions 
for progress at integration than North Africa and the Middle East.  
 
 
The Great Integration Blockers: Arab Socialism and Import-Substitution 
Industrialization 
The first practical experiences with Pan-Arabism in practice were disappointing. 
But there was still the possibility that more functional cooperation might build 
up new bonds among the Arab states. There were indeed efforts in this direction. 
The collective-security agreement of 1950 contained also a section on economic 
cooperation. This was followed up by a Convention for Facilitating Trade and 
Regulating Transit Trade in 1953 and in 1957 by the Arab Economic Unity 
Agreement. In 1964 new initiatives were taken in order to create an Arab 
Common Market (Fawzy, 15). The bottom line of all these agreements is that 
they did not become effective. Signing agreements and then not complying has 
been a recurrent feature with the Arab states. It might again be explained by the 
constellation of making symbolic concessions to Pan-Arabism, while in practice 
not wanting to give up sovereignty. 
  
However, in the 1950s, seemingly the heyday of Pan-Arabism, a process started 
which erected heavy, solid barriers among the Arab states: The drive towards 
Arab Socialism in some countries, or at least to the milder Import-Substitution 
Industrialization in others. And the country pioneering this process was exactly 
Nasser’s Egypt. 
  
On 23 July 1952 the so-called “Free Officers” seized power. The group had been 
formed secretly presumably in 1942, after King Farouq had to accept a 
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humiliating British ultimatum. In the view of the conspiring officers, Egypt 
could have a future only if they could destroy the, as they saw it, interlinked 
power triangle of British prerogatives, the king and the liberal Wafd party 
(which dominated the parliament). The group never developed a coherent 
ideology, but in 1951 they formulated at least six guiding principles: Destroying 
British occupation and their Egyptian collaborators, eliminating feudalism, 
ending capitalism’s domination over politics, establishing social equality, 
forming a strong popular army and creating a healthy democratic life. “These 
points were open to a variety of interpretations”, as Arthur Goldschmidt put it 
(Goldschmidt, 89). 
  
As it turned out, by “creating a healthy democratic life” Nasser and his 
comrades meant erecting a full-fledged dictatorship. Furthermore, soon after the 
coup the government engineered a land reform by which land from large estates 
were distributed to peasants. By this move the officers gained popular support 
(by then still about 60 percent of the population worked in agriculture), and at 
the same time they destroyed the economic basis of the traditional elites which 
dominated the Wafd and other parties (Goldschmidt, 92). Stepwise the supply of 
seeds and fertilizers, agricultural credit and the purchase of agricultural products 
came under tight state control. This way the state could transfer huge sums from 
the peasants to the state. The money was used to enlarge the army and to start an 
ambitious industrialization program, to be powered by the projected Aswan 
Dam. The state gained additional sources of income by the nationalization of the 
Suez Canal in 1956, and of foreign property after the Anglo-French-Israeli 
attack. Even more money could be mobilized by foreign credits, e.g. from 
China. State planning agencies were entitled to set up new state-owned 
companies. Finally, the July Laws of 1961 completed the march towards 
socialism. Most industries and all banks and insurance companies were 
socialized, others became strictly regulated. There was an upper limit of about 
11,500 dollar for the annual salary, and the maximum amount of land which 
could be owned privately was again reduced, from 200 to 100 feddan, the 
feddan being about 1.038 acres (Goldschmidt 116f and 171). 
  
Within a comparatively short time span Egypt society was profoundly 
transformed. The traditional elites were destroyed, and so was political 
pluralism, a free press and parliamentary rule. Political power was monopolized 
in one-party rule, with the army in the background. The means of production 
were predominantly state property, the rest were under tight state control. The 
coordination of economic processes and investment were mainly done by state 
bureaucracies. Nasser was no Moscow-trained ideologue. But the system he 
created came to show remarkable similarities with the Soviet model, or rather: 
With the model in place in Poland, the still large agricultural sector mainly in 
private hands (under state control). 
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This was not planned for in 1952. I see the main reason for this development in 
the working of structural functional prerequisites which start to operate once 
certain basic decisions are taken. János Kornai, of Budapest and Harvard, 
perhaps the economist who has most shaped thinking on the economies of 
socialist systems, coined the expression of the “affinity of the elements of the 
socialist system”. Using a chemical analogy, the phenomena attract and require 
each other: “The monolithic structure of power, petrified ideological doctrines, 
almost total domination of state-ownership, direct bureaucratic control, forced 
growth, shortage, and distrustful withdrawal from most of the world … all 
belong to each other and strengthen each other” (Kornai 1992, 366). 
  
The key point in this respect seems to be the large-scale confiscation of private 
property. Once this is done, private capital accumulation dries out as a generator 
of investment and growth. The state has to do most investment and needs more 
and more means for doing this. Markets become destroyed or at least heavily 
distorted, consequently state bureaucracies have to take over the coordination of 
economic activities – in an ever more comprehensive way. Private business must 
come under control because the state cannot allow that they become competitors 
for e.g. manpower, this would drive salaries in the state-owned sector up. 
Particularly important in our context: The state has to establish rigid control of 
cross-border activities, in order to prevent capital flight, in order to gain control 
over private exporters, and in order to protect its (usually rather inefficient) 
state-owned enterprises from foreign competition. 
  
Quite a similar development took place in Algeria6 after independence in 1962 
and later on also in Syria, Iraq and Libya, military dictatorships all of them. 
Tunisia took some steps in this direction, but reversed them soon. It requires 
indeed revolutionary dictatorial rule to establish such a system because large-
scale confiscations and massive infringements of economic freedom of 
practically the whole population can only be imposed by the use of force and the 
destruction of the old elites. In Morocco the traditional system survived, two 
military coups in 1972 and 1973 failed. King Hassan II based his rule on the 
support of traditional rural notables and French-educated bourgeois groups. 
Under these conditions, Arab socialism was no option. However, being an open 
economy at independence in 1956 Morocco gradually turned to a rather closed 
model of import-substitution industrialization where the receipts of the state-
owned phosphate exports were used to expand the public sector and its 
enterprises behind high tariff walls. This was a much milder form of dirigisme 
than Arab Socialism, but it also impeded economic cross-border transaction to a 
high extent. In the Arab world only North Yemen, since 1990 the united Yemen, 
has had an open economy all the time (Sachs and Warner, 94). 
                                                          
6  I have discussed the developments in the North African countries in more detail in Zank, 
2008 b. 
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This move to variants of socialism or Import-Substitution Industrialization in the 
1950s and 1960s was not an Arab particularity; it was a world-wide movement 
which covered almost the whole Third World (and the Second). By 1960 only 
about 20 percent of the world population lived in open economies (Sachs and 
Warner, 12). How can such a worldwide trend be explained? One important 
factor was certainly the experience of the Great Depression in the interwar 
years. The Third-World countries, being independent or still colonies, exported 
mainly raw commodities and suffered from horrible setbacks. For instance, from 
1928/9 to 1932/3 Egypt’s export earnings plummeted by more than 60 percent. 
This was not even the worst case, in Chile the figure was above 80 percent 
(Kindleberger, 200). Against this background it cannot be a surprise that many 
politicians in the Third World were highly sceptical about the benefits of free 
trade. In the 1950s and 1960s this scepticism has been widely shared by many 
Western economists and by many specialists in the UN system. Most prominent 
was perhaps Raul Prebisch, the director of the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America. He saw a danger that the logics of comparative advantage would 
lock the countries of the periphery into their status of primary-commodity 
producers where in turn they had to face systematic shifts of their terms of trade 
to their detriment. He (and many others) advocated the protection of infant 
industries and import substitution.7 “Export pessimism” seemed all the more 
justified because at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s also the 
Western economies had still rather high tariffs and other barriers as to 
manufactured goods, let alone agricultural products. Consequently, import 
substitution and state-led industrialization seemed to be the rational conclusion 
of past experiences and present conditions. In many countries, for instance 
democratic India at the time of independence in 1947, it was based on a broad 
societal consensus, the business community included (Chandra, Mukherjee and 
Mukherjee, 444f). 
  
Furthermore, cutting off many links to the world market could also be seen as 
“economic de-colonization”, making the new states “properly” independent and 
“standing on their own feet”. Leaders such as Nasser who tried to gain 
legitimacy by profiling themselves as “anti-imperialists” had therefore another 
reason to embark on inward-looking development strategies. 
  
Furthermore, the seemingly successful industrialization of the Soviet Union, its 
victory in World War II and its rise to world-power status could not fail to 
impress and inspire political leaders all over the Third World. There was, 
however, one big difference. For Nehru socialism was inseparable from 
democracy; strengthening the public sector and economic planning had to be 
done in a democratic and consensual manner (Chandra, Mukherjee and 
                                                          
7  We notice, however, that the infant-industry argument favours selected, targeted 
protectionism, not an allround entrenchment, as it actually took place in many countries. 
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Mukherjee, 447). The matter was completely different with autocrats such as 
Nkrumah, Nasser or Boumedienne. Scholars such as Forrest D. Colburn 
emphasized the importance of ideas when it comes to explain the choices of 
revolutionary leaders: They were not constraint by institutions and pluralism and 
therefore “the time of experimentation and implementation of ideas can be 
dangerously compressed” (as quoted in Sachs and Warner, 17). However, at 
least for the Arab military dictatorship I would add a rational-choice argument: 
Large-scale confiscations and establishing a command economy was seemingly 
a way towards greatly enlarging their control over society. In particular the 
military profited from this, “transforming the Middle East into one of the most 
heavily militarized regions in the world, with the highest levels of military 
expenditures … and the largest-sized military establishment relative to the 
general population” (Barnett and Solingen, 183). In this perspective, “socialism” 
appears to have been mainly an ideological smoke-screen. And Arab Socialism 
could become rather widespread for a period because the Arab states had rather 
weak institutions which made the region rather coup-prone. Between 1949 and 
1980 there were 55 attempts, about half of them successful (Zoli, 105). 
  
Whatever the constellation of factors in the particular case: As a consequence of 
the transition to socialism or import-substitution protectionism, a dense network 
of cross-border transactions, so important in the integration theory of e.g. Karl 
W. Deutsch, could not develop in the Arab world. Nor could neo-functionalist 
spill-over effects make themselves felt: Functional cooperation had to remain 
very restricted, any attempt of enlarging it carried the risk of undermining the 
protectionist systems. In the case of the countries practicing Arab Socialism also 
another aspect should be highlighted: Under Arab Socialism the business 
community and other interest groups, whether urban or agrarian, were declared 
to be enemies. As, for instance Algeria’s Houari Boumedienne declared: “Either 
the agrarian revolution will succeed … or we will end up with a new Algerian 
bourgeoisie that will perhaps be tougher and more vile than the colonial 
bourgeoisie that used to exploit us” (Moore 1984, 592). This way, however, 
huge groups of potential practical workers for Arab integration became 
dissolved. As not the least the experiences of European integration have shown, 
the business community and other interest groups played an important role for 
lobbying for more integration. As early as 1958 Ernst Haas identified these 
groups as important proponents of further integration in his seminal “The 
Unification of Europe” (Haas 2004 [1957]) But the governments of “Arab 
Socialism” could not be lobbied in this direction because these lobby groups did 
not exist anymore. 
  
Furthermore, the erection of revolutionary types of dictatorship divided the Arab 
world into two very different groups of socio-political systems: There were 
traditional authoritarian countries such as Morocco or Saudi Arabia, with their 
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old-fashioned notables, religious leaders and newer bourgeois elites, and there 
were the revolutionary dictatorships where traditional and bourgeois elites were 
downed, completely or at least to a high extent. Under these conditions at most 
some kind of closely circumscribed intergovernmental cooperation was possible, 
whereas any kind of closer integration which required mutual trust became 
excluded. Rather, mistrust and ideological and rhetorical incursions into the 
territory of the neighbours, with a view to undermine the government there, 
became the rule. In the 1960s during the civil war in Yemen the two groups 
came even into direct and indirect military confrontation: Egyptian troops 
intervened on the side of the republicans and Algeria delivered arms, whereas 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan backed the royalists. This was also an international 
conflict, with Great Britain supporting the conservative camp and the Soviet 
Union and China their adversaries (Heller, 130-135).  
  
This was not the only inter-Arab military conflict: Algeria and Morocco fought a 
border war in 1963. In 1970 Syria intervened in Jordan in order to support the 
PLO, a move, however, stopped by air-force commander Hafiz el-Assad. Egypt 
and Libya also fought a short war.  The Arab defeat in the war of 1967 against 
Israel dealt an incurable blow to the prestige of Nasser and other front-figures of 
Pan-Arabism. And in 1979, after the Camp-David agreement, Egypt, founding 
member and biggest Arab country, was even excluded from the Arab League. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, hardly any region on earth was visibly as divided as the 
Arab world.  
 
When turning to comparative studies, early on authors such as Ernst Haas and 
Philipp Schmitter have underlined that neo-functionalist logics and spill-over 
effects could only create an integrationist drive when certain background 
conditions were in place, for instance social pluralism. I would highlight in 
particular the importance of the economy being open. These conditions were not 
in place in the Arab world (and many other regions. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 
concluded from this that neo-functionalist theory had very “limited scope” 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 96). I draw the opposite conclusion: By highlighting that 
certain conditions have to be fulfilled if integration is to progress, the theory also 
specifies when we cannot expect integrationist dynamics. The Arab World has 
been a case in point. A Pan-Arabist ideology and high-pitch rhetoric, a common 
language or a common religion could not be a substitute for pluralism and the 
openness of the economy. 
  
We can also formulate these points in terms of Historical Institutionalism: The 
military coups and large-scale confiscations created dynamics which showed a 
high degree of “path dependency” – dynamics which worked strongly against 
more integration.  
 
 
 19
Gradual opening and progress at economic integration 
Inward-looking protectionist strategies and socialism turned out to be a road to 
bankruptcy, on a world-wide scale. As, for instance, Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew 
Warner showed, open economies8 had a systematically higher growth rate: In 
the period from 1970 to 1989, open developing countries experienced on 
average a growth rate per capita of by 4.49 per cent; closed developing countries 
registered only 0.69 per cent. And furthermore, the closed economies 
experienced a long-term slowdown of their growth rates, from 2or 3 percent in 
the late 1960s down to around 0 at the end of the 1980s (Sachs and Warner, 
36f). This meant also that there was convergence within the groups of open 
economies (the poorer one growing faster than the rich ones), whereas there was 
no such trend among the closed economies. And last not least: Among those 
developing countries which were open in the 1970s, only one out of 17 
experienced a major macroeconomic crisis in the 1980s(Jordan). But in the huge 
group of 73 closed developing economies in their sample, 59, or four out of five, 
were shaken by a major crisis.  
  
Interestingly, even an extremely oil- and gas-rich country such as Algeria ran 
into a severe debt crisis. The reasons behind the Algerian bankruptcy were the 
following: The state commissioned the construction of numerous new industrial 
plants which, however, turned out to be financial sinks. Running these plants 
required also huge sums of foreign currency. Also enlarging the state 
bureaucracy and the army swallowed huge sums. At the same time, the agrarian 
“reforms” and the low prices for agricultural products impoverished the country 
side which in turn led to increased migration to the urban agglomerations and 
burdened social conditions there. The stagnating level of agrarian productivity 
also meant that more and more food had to be imported; alimentary self-
sufficiency fell to 30 percent in 1980. The dinar was kept overvalued, not the 
least in order to keep imported food cheap, but this meant that practically no 
other economic branch outside oil and gas could compete on foreign markets. 
By 1993 97 percent of all export earnings came from oil and gas. The system 
                                                          
8  They classified a country as being not open when one of the following criteria was 
fulfilled: Average tariff of 40 percent or more, non-tariff barriers covering 40 percent or 
more of trade, a black-market exchange rate depreciated by 20 percent or more compared 
with the official exchange rate (indicating restrictions on access to foreign currency), a 
state monopoly on major exports (which implies distortions on foreign trade similar to 
tariffs), or being a socialist system according to Kornai’s classification (Sachs and 
Warner, 22). “Openness” in their classification thereby does not mean complete laissez-
faire policies. As they point out, a country such as South Korea has had an actively 
intervening state. However, when compared with most developing countries, Korea’s 
trade barriers (and those of the other East and South East Asian countries) have been very 
modest. And as they further point out, a transition to openness implies a whole set of 
corresponding reforms, so their indicator “openness” is actually a proxy for a whole set of 
interrelated economic policies. 
 20
could be kept running as long as the oil price was high. But the lower oil and gas 
prices after 1985 meant increasing deficits which the government tried to cover 
with taking up more and loans. By 1992, 77 percent of the export earnings were 
used to service the foreign debt, and by 1994 her foreign exchange reserves were 
empty. There was no way but to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and to ask for credit and a rescheduling of the foreign debt (Zank 2009 b, 123-
6).  
  
Processes of this kind could be observed in all countries of Arab socialism. But 
also Morocco’s with her import-substitution industrialization experienced severe 
crises: At times when the phosphate earnings were high, much money was used 
to inflate the state apparatus and its loss-making state-owned enterprises.  
Falling phosphate prices then implied disaster (Zank 2009 b, 127). 
  
Arab socialism and import-substitution strategies came out of fashion, gradually 
the Arab countries turned more open and more market oriented. Measured on 
the criteria of Sachs and Warner, Jordan became open already by 1965, Morocco 
in 1984, Tunisia in 1989 (Sachs and Warner, 84, 86 and 93). Tunisia turned out 
to be a rather consistent reformer on the way towards market economy and 
experienced also steady economic growth. Her GDP per head passed that of 
Algeria which is statistically heavily inflated by the oil and gas revenues. But in 
the other cases the process of reform was slow and erratic. Even in cases where 
the authoritarian ruler early on urged to proceed with it, as in the case of 
Morocco. Markets and cross-border exchange remained heavily distorted, albeit 
by a slowly decreasing degree. Consequently, economic growth was slow 
throughout most of the 1990s and early 2000s. The income gap between the 
Mediterranean Arab countries and those at the northern shores did not narrow 
for many years. It did so actually the last years (Femise 2008, 3-5). 
  
How can the slow reform process (again a phenomenon to be observed in many 
Third-World countries) be explained? To a high-extent presumably by the fact 
that the long periods of protectionism have created vested interests in its 
perpetuation: Domestic industries which sell only on the home market, 
employees of state-owned industries and politicians whose power base is 
anchored there. These interests are rather concentrated and could thereby 
become powerful when it comes to the prolongation of the old system. By 
contrast, those who benefit from the reforms are more dispersed, and most of 
them have presumably not been informed about the potential advantages. Again 
models of collective-action problems can explain a lot; in particular the unequal 
strength of concentrated versus dispersed interests, as highlighted by authors 
such as Mancur Olsen, is important in this context.  
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The creation of vested interests in protectionism can also seen as another case of 
“path dependency”: Not making a transition to openness completely impossible, 
but at least delaying it substantially.  
  
Another factor has been oil and gas: High revenues from hydrocarbon exports 
enabled some regimes to postpone reforms. They had a motive for doing this 
because economic reforms towards more open market economies unavoidably 
imply some short-term political costs. But postponing reforms comes at a much 
higher price later on. Economists have therefore talked of a “resource curse”. 
Algeria or Libya have been cases in point. In this perspective it is no 
coincidence that the signatories of the Agadir Treaty, so far the boldest initiative  
to free trade among them, are Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, all of them 
countries with no or rather small oil revenues.  
  
In addition, a transition to an open economy is for many people a journey into 
unknown territory and therefore frightening, a factor which groups hostile to 
reform could exploit. Also ideological anti-capitalist motives have played a role.  
  
But some reforms towards openness and towards market economy took place. 
The Arab countries became more pluralistic, socially and also politically, 
although until now none of them can classify as democracy. It does not seem to 
be a coincidence that under these new circumstances the first initiative with real 
effects towards Arab economic integration could be launched: In 1995 the Arab 
League passed a resolution for free trade, and in 1997 18 countries signed the 
program for a Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). The agreement basically 
provided for an annual reduction of tariffs by 10 per cent, and in January 1998, 
14 countries which stood for 95 % of inter-Arab trade began actually 
implementing the program. In 2001 they decided to accelerate the process, and 
in January 2005 the custom duties and taxes of equivalent effect that were on the 
list became officially abolished, among by then 13 countries, Iraq not included 
(Wippel, 45). Other Arab countries will join later. Many barriers remained in 
place, but at least as regards tariffs progress has been substantial. For once, there 
has been tangible progress at Arab integration. 
  
Another example of success at integration has been the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, founded in 1981 by six Arab gulf states. They have had similar 
political systems and are all ruled by traditional elites. They built up a rather 
close cooperation, mainly on the field of internal security, some currents of 
Islamism being their common enemy. But they also established a custom union 
by 2003 and are currently on a course towards economic and monetary union, a 
common currency to be installed by 2010.  
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However, as regards GAFTA there is something of “too little and too late”. To 
start with, as a result of the successive GATT and WTO rounds, tariffs are 
generally quite low by now. In the 1950s, a program such as GAFTA would 
have had a strong impact, but today its effect is comparatively modest. 
Furthermore, GAFTA is only about “shallow” integration which addresses 
mainly tariffs at the border. “Deep integration” with reforms “behind the border” 
such as liberalizing services and investment, intellectual property rights, 
harmonizing standards and other important non-tariff barriers were not included. 
  
Non-tariff barriers are notoriously difficult to assess, but there are estimates. 
Very useful material is to be found in a survey, which Jamel Zarrouk organized 
in 2000. A questionnaire was sent to randomly selected companies and 
respondents in eight Arab countries. According to Zarrouk’s findings, by then 
tariffs and import duties were still seen as the major constraints. But in addition 
to these, the surveyed companies estimated the average costs of trading at about 
10.6 percent of the trade value (Zarrouk, 50). The major burdens were, in the 
order of their importance, customs clearance, public sector corruption, 
mandatory product standards and certification of conformity, trans-shipment 
regulations and visa restrictions for business travels. “Informal payments” to 
officials were on average at a level of 1 percent of the value of the goods, with 
variations among the countries. Egypt, Lebanon and Syria ranked high, whereas 
in Tunisia and the UAE the payment level was rather modest. Import clearance 
was very time consuming. It took two to five days on average to get goods 
released imported by air, two to ten days for sea transport and one to three for 
lorries (Zarrouk, 53). Importers had to file 5 or 6 documents and needed 10 to 20 
signatures (every signature, of course, a potential corruption point). On average 
a company had to use 95 work-days per year for resolving customs procedures 
and being in contact with other government officials. In Egypt, Jordan and Syria 
100, 200 and 209 work-days respectively had to be used for this. However, at 
least in Egypt and Jordan matters have improved relatively. 
  
On the field of services, the major obstacles have been licensing procedures, 
state monopolies on certain fields, exclusive agency laws, the mandatory 
employment of nationals and again corruption. As to the business climate in 
general, weak legal systems were identified as the major obstacle, enforcing a 
contract is usually very difficult. 
  
We might add to this list of barriers the point that also the physical infrastructure 
for inter-Arab trade is still inadequate in many places. This is easy to explain: 
Why should the countries in the past invest in costly cross-border infrastructure 
when there was not much trade anyhow due to the protectionist systems? Seen 
in this light the inadequate infrastructure reflects past policies. But today the 
infrastructure bottle-necks act as barriers on their own to the expansion of trade. 
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In comparative terms, the Arab countries have become relatively poor. Egypt’s 
per capita income was in the 1950s similar to that of South Korea, by now it is 
less than one-fifth. Morocco’s was close to that of Malaysia and is today only 
one third. And Saudi Arabia’s, higher than Taiwan’s in the 1950s, is less than a 
half by now, Saudi Arabia’s oil richness not withstanding (Galal and Hoekman 
b, 2). This means in relative terms, in the 1950s the Arab countries could have 
been interesting markets for each other; by now, because of their relative 
poverty other markets are much more interesting for most Arab exporters.  
 
 
More integration – with Europe 
In fact, for most Arab countries the EU member states are much more important 
as trade partners. In the period of 2000-03 Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Mauretania and Libya had more than 50 percent of their trade with the EU-15 
countries, the figure being as high as 74 percent for Tunisia and 62 percent for 
Morocco. Trade with GAFTA countries has been a small fraction of this, 7 
percent in the case of Morocco and Tunisia. Only Jordan, land-locked inside 
GAFTA, has had a higher share with GAFTA countries than with the EU-15; 29 
versus 23 per cent (Wippel, 45). And in the least years trade with the EU has 
developed rather strongly in absolute terms. The relative share of the EU, 
however, has been slightly declining, due to the dynamic developments in other 
emerging markets (Femise, 8-10). 
  
On first glance it looks almost natural that the EU became the major trade 
partner for most Arab countries, given the point that Arab exporters could find 
in Europe a rather rich market in relative proximity. But it has also very much to 
do with EU policy. At a time when the Arab countries isolated themselves from 
each other, the EU9 was comparatively open. And in the course of time it turned 
progressively ever more open. 
  
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 lifted trade policy on the supra-national community 
level, and it opened also the possibility of concluding association agreements 
with other countries. However, in the 1960s not much progress could be 
recorded as regards the Arab countries. But in 1969, after protracted 
negotiations, agreements with some trade preferences, including agricultural 
products, could be concluded with Morocco and Tunisia; Italy, being worried 
about more competition, received some side-payments to improve her olive oil 
and citrus production. In general, by then the Mediterranean non-member 
countries were low on the list of the priorities of the EU (Gomez, 26-30 and 39). 
Why did Morocco and Tunisia sign agreements? These countries were ruled by 
rather pragmatic pro-Western or at least not anti-Western elites and therefore 
                                                          
9  For the sake of simplicity I write consistently EU although it was for many years 
abbreviated e.g. EEC. 
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actively interested in cooperation. This was a rarity by then. Other 
Mediterranean Arab countries – Algeria, Egypt, Syria - were in the 1960s ruled 
by new dictatorships which tried to garner legitimacy by profiling themselves as 
“anti-imperialist”. By contrast, the kingdom of Morocco was built on traditional 
and religious legitimacy. Furthermore, a substantial part of its elite, including 
King Hassan II, were socialized to work for Western-type modernity, at least in 
its technological and administrative sense. The same was true was the Tunisian 
leadership under Habib Bourguiba, the independence party Neo-Destour to quite 
some extent modelled along the lines of the French socialist party (Murphy, 44-
7). Also these constellations created “path dependencies”: Ever since Morocco 
and Tunisia have been the front-runners when it came to extending cooperation 
with the EU. 
  
EU policy towards the Mediterranean was placed on a much more 
comprehensive basis with the formulation of the Global Mediterranean Policy 
(GMP), a strategy formulated by the Commission in 1972 on request of the 
member states. According to Eberhard Rhein, a formed director of DG1 in the 
commission, the GMP was the “first example of a coherent piece of Community 
foreign policy” (Gomez, 34). The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the ensuing oil 
embargo brought the Arab world to the forefront of the agenda.  
  
The GMP envisaged concluding “Cooperation Agreements” with all 
Mediterranean non-member countries. These countries should have improved 
access to the EU markets. The long-term aim should be a Mediterranean Free 
Trade Area – not many Arab leaders by that time thinking in such terms. The 
Cooperation Agreements should also include provisions on technical 
cooperation, technology transfer and capital movements, migration and 
environmental and financial cooperation. In addition, loans and grants from the 
EU budget and the European Investment Bank (EIB) were to be mobilized. 
Finally, various forms of trans-Mediterranean dialogue should be 
institutionalized. 
  
In the period up to 1977 the EU created a network of 13 new agreements which 
covered all Mediterranean countries except Albania and Libya. In addition 
membership negotiations were under way for Greece, Portugal and Spain. The 
EU came thereby geographically closer to the Arab world. In this process in 
April 1976 Cooperation Agreements were concluded with Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia. Lebanon followed in May 1976 and finally Egypt and Syria in January 
1977. From this point onwards the Arab countries which participated in the 
scheme have had free access to the EU markets in industrial products except 
textiles and refined petroleum products. The duties on agricultural products 
became completely removed for some products and substantially lowered for 
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others. Also the markets of the Iberian countries and Greece became gradually 
open for Arab products. 
  
Also these Cooperation Agreements were asymmetrical: The EU opened its 
markets, but the Arab partner countries did not have to do so likewise. From the 
perspective of Pan-Arabism this had a paradoxical result: The Mediterranean 
Arab countries could practically freely export to the EU. But not towards each 
other, there heavy restrictions remained in place. 
  
However, the Cooperation Agreements were soon seen as insufficient. By now 
there were much fewer restrictions one the EU side, but the remaining ones, e.g. 
on textiles, were felt heavy burdens on the southern and eastern shore of the 
Mediterranean. Many Arab countries had to struggle with severe economic 
problems, and the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism created worries also in 
Europe. In particular for France, Spain and Italy Mediterranean problems 
became a top priority, and when they held the EU presidency in 1989 and 1990 
they could support Commission proposals for a “Redirected Mediterranean 
Policy” (RMP) which aimed at a new  generation of agreements.  In this context 
in 1990 all restrictions on textile imports from Mediterranean countries were 
lifted, and the funds from the EU budget and the EIB were nearly tripled. An 
innovative trait: 2.3 billion ECU were mobilized in order to support 
“decentralized, horizontal or regional cooperation” (Gomez, 49-51). In other 
words, the EU started to fund practical initiatives at Arab integration.  
  
In 1993 negotiations for so-called Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
were opened with Morocco and Tunisia, soon afterwards also with the other 
Mediterranean non-members (except Libya) and with Jordan. In 1994 these 
treaty negotiations were grouped in one framework, the “Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership”. The treaty with Turkey in 1995 was the most comprehensive one 
and established a proper custom union with the EU. Negotiations with the other 
countries were aimed at establishing free trade in industrial goods after a 
transition phase of usually 12 years. This time it was not any more on 
preferential market access to the EU market. Now the non-member countries 
should bring down their trade barriers too, but could also get more EU support. 
Accepting this line implied, of course, the official end of “Import-Substitution 
Industrialization”. 
  
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia were the countries which showed most 
interest in such a process, the negotiations for Euro-Mediterranean Agreements 
were concluded already in 1995 with Morocco and Tunisia, with Jordan in 1997 
and with Egypt in 1999. These countries signed also bilateral free-trade 
agreements among each other. In 2001 they also launched the so-called Agadir 
Process with a view to establish a Free Trade Area among them. This new 
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“Agadir Agreement” was signed in Rabat on 25 February 2004. At first sight 
this looks like duplicating the GAFTA process, but it is not. The Agadir 
countries decided to liberalize in close contact with the EU. For instance, they 
liberalized among themselves trade in all goods which were covered by the 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, thereby avoiding that these 
agreements might create hub-and-spoke effects with Europe. The agreement is 
also more comprehensive than the GAFTA treaty allowing for fewer exceptions. 
A complex problem were the “rules of origin”. In the Euro-Med Associations 
Agreements these rules are formulated rather generous, allowing also for 
diagonal cumulation (a shirt produced in, say, Tunisia with cotton from Egypt 
and buttons from Morocco can enter the EU on the same term as if all was 
produced in Tunisia). In 2002 a unified “Pan-Euro cumulation system” was 
created an applied to the eight Arab partner countries and Israel. The Agadir 
countries opted for applying these rules also among themselves (Wippel, 8-10). 
This was also a sign of a clear commitment to the idea of the Mediterranean 
Free Trade Area, and of giving priority to the Mediterranean project over the 
GAFTA process. Among the non-EU members, the Agadir countries are the 
front-runners of the future Mediterranean Free Trade Area. The rules in GAFTA 
diverge in some fields from the Pan-European ones, which in some cases created 
additional costs of e.g. certifying. 
  
Numerous studies have confirmed that the gradual opening of the Arab 
economies as a consequence of the Euro-Med agreements has been beneficial, 
and the effects ex-post were actually bigger than the ones calculated ex-ante. 
According to a FEMISE report, every reduction of tariffs by 1 percent was 
matched by a GDP growth of 0.3 percent; consumption rose by 0.116 per cent 
and investment by 0.176 per cent. Naturally, imports have reacted stronger than 
exports (0.376 versus 0.288) because it was the non-members which had to 
become more open whereas the EU side was open already beforehand (Femise, 
3). But according to expectation in the course of time also exports will receive a 
boost because it is now much easier to import inputs for export production.  
  
Also the accompanying measures to the Euro-Med agreements seem to have 
been beneficial. According to Zarrouk’s survey, companies in Morocco and 
Tunisia (the first to sign) mentioned in particular the mise à niveau programs, 
tailored courses for the restructuring of companies (Zarrouk, 57). 
 
In November 1995 at the conference in Barcelona a new multi-lateral and multi-
level process was launched which has involved the EU member countries and all 
Mediterranean non-members, Israel included. The governments endorsed a 
declaration which envisaged a working program on three fields: Political and 
security partnership, economic and financial partnership and partnership in 
social, human and cultural affairs. The economic chapter contained a 
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commitment to establishing a Mediterranean Free Trade Area “covering most 
goods” by 2010.10 Regular meetings on all levels should promote mutual 
understanding and concrete cooperation. The contacts have indeed multiplied, 
numerous fora and workshops have taken place; many new patters of 
institutionalized cooperation across the Mediterranean Sea were installed. One 
example is FEMISE (Forum Euro-Méditerranéen des Instituts Économiques), a 
regular cooperation of economic research institutes, with a view to monitor the 
progress at economic cooperation, whose 2007 report was quoted above. The 
numerous contacts and forms of cooperation have had a socializing effect and 
created among those involved a “spirit of partnership” (Jünemann, 8). And 
during the process the amount of financial support from the EU was 
considerably increased. In the second half of the 1990s it corresponded to 0.2 
percent of the aggregate GDP of the recipient countries; in the 2000-2004 period 
it was up to 0.5 percent (Nsouli, 5) The long-term effects of the Barcelona 
Process might be important.  
  
However, when taking stock of the progress ten years after the Barcelona 
Conference, the observers came to rather sober assessments. Measured along the 
expectations of 1995 the results were modest. One major factor was the 
worsening of the Palestine conflict which made Arab states down-scale or end 
their participation in forums where Israel was present. Another major obstacle to 
cooperation and dialogue has been conflicting interests and understandings. For 
instance strengthening human rights is not a point which authoritarian regimes 
have on the top of their priorities. Also combating terrorism becomes difficult 
when there is not consensus about who the terrorists are. There are therefore 
inherently strong limitations for this kind of intergovernmental multilateral 
cooperation. In particular, when some of the participating countries are still 
rather closed.  
  
The Barcelona Process became re-vitalized in a somewhat strange way in 2007, 
when the French President Nicholas Sarkozy launched the idea of a Union pour 
la Méditerranée. Originally it was clearly intended as a new club, comprising 
only the countries along the shores of the Mediterranean, with the possible 
addition of countries such as Mauretania. One hidden aim was, according to 
press reports, to create an alternative for Turkish EU membership. However, 
Sarkozy came under strong pressure from other EU leaders, not the least 
Germany’s Angela Merkel who insisted that the EU has developed a common 
Mediterranean policy, and that there was no need to start initiatives to weaken it 
with new arrangements which would exclude most EU members. And there 
could surely be no EU money for such an initiative. Sarkozy gave in, the face-
                                                          
10  This deadline has become unrealistic because some of the Euro-Mediterrenean 
Association Agreements came into force later, 2005 in the case of Algeria. The transition 
time of 12 years means that free trade is postponed accordingly. 
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saving solution being that the Mediterranean Union could be created, but firmly 
within the Barcelona Process (Hehn). It was officially launched on 13 July 2008. 
In addition to the countries of the Barcelona Process, also Mauretania, Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina are along. But otherwise it looks very much like just 
another name for something which has been there already beforehand. 
  
Presumably much more important than Barcelona Process or Mediterranean 
Union was the launch of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2003. 
This was yet another initiative to strengthen the ties between the EU and her 
neighbours, both in the south and the east. In contrast to the Barcelona Process, 
the neighbouring countries become targeted one by one. If a country is 
interested, the EU offers technical and financial support (the amount of money 
again being increased) on practically all fields. The explicit aim is to strengthen 
human rights, democratization and economic integration. If a neighbouring 
country wants to participate, it has to accept that the EU Commission writes a 
“country report”, and thereafter the two sides can elaborate an “Action Plan” 
where the priorities are listed which the EU will direct its assistance at. 
Currently ( January 2009) such Actions Plans are in place in the Mediterranean 
Basin with Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory and Tunisia. Libya, originally not on the list of the ENP countries, has 
moved dramatically in relative terms and seems to opt for more cooperation with 
the EU. Also Syria seems to be moving in this direction. In the case of Algeria, 
an association agreement with the gradual move to free trade came in force in 
2005, but the government does not seem to be interested in a closer cooperation 
as envisaged by the ENP. 
   
As a novelty, the ENP offers a “stake in EU’s internal market”. The precise 
content of this term is still in the process of definition, but it implies assisting 
these countries at overcoming barriers to their exports. In particular the dense 
networks of EU regulations can be a substantial problem. For instance on the 
important field of agricultural and food exports the phyto-sanitary and veterinary 
regulations of the EU are in many cases a bigger hindrance than traditional 
protectionism. But exactly here the EU can assist at building up the necessary 
expertise and institutions, programs of such kind are in place in several 
countries. This is part of a much broader problem, namely that the EU has 
become a regulator and norm setter also for markets outside its borders. 
Numerous countries and companies have voluntary adapted to EU norms, in 
order to have access to the EU market. Others anticipate that when it comes e.g. 
to ecological standards, the often stricter EU norms will be introduced in other 
countries sooner or later too, which creates another motive to comply with EU 
norms. The process of adapting to EU norms can have far-reaching 
consequences for neighbouring countries and can result in substantial spill-
overs. 
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The acquiring of a “stake in the internal market” has the potential of “deep 
integration” with the EU, an integration which implies many changes “behind 
the borders”. The process will presumably also include services. Again 
according to FEMISE, the potential gains for the Arab countries are high, but 
very different from sector to sector, and with some problematic side-effects, if 
executed too briskly; for instance the opening of retail trade will be beneficial 
for consumers, but it could create serious unemployment problems (Femise 
2007, 41-51). Liberalizing services will also require for more mobility across the 
Mediterranean because service production usually implies that the provider is 
physically present at the customer. 
  
The network of cooperation between Mediterranean Arab countries and the EU 
is already quite dense. This is in particular the case with Morocco and Tunisia, 
which have followed such a course rather consistently the last decades. Also 
Egypt has clearly developed in this direction. It is difficult to assess the political 
impact of this cooperation. What does it mean that e.g. Tunisia and Morocco 
participate in the Galileo satellite project? Or that students from these countries 
receive Erasmus grants? That Morocco participates at the EU peace keeping 
mission in Bosnia Herzegovina? Or more recently, that the customs authorities 
of all 27 EU members, of Croatia and Norway, but also Morocco and Tunisia 
jointly stroke at illegal cross-country money transfer? (Fri./now). 
  
The network of institutionalized cooperation across the Mediterranean Sea 
seems to be much denser than the one between the Arab countries. Now the 
Arab countries have become relatively open, at least in economic terms and in 
comparison to previous decades. Interest groups such as the business community 
can develop (albeit to a different degree). Now we can expect spill-over effects 
among Arab countries, of the functional, political and the cultivated type. But in 
a number of Arab countries the spill-overs seem to favour mainly integration 
with Europe. 
  
In particular I expect the project of a “stake in EUs internal market” to have the 
potential of unleashing strong dynamics. For those countries which are 
interested in getting this stake, EU decisions will become of increasing 
importance. They will therefore have a likewise increasing interest in 
influencing EU decisions, for instance through intensified dialogue or direct 
lobby activities in Brussels. Increasingly the governments of these Arab 
countries have to direct their attention to Brussels.  
  
It was processes of this kind which Ernst Haas detected in the 1950s in the 
European Coal and Steel Community and which made him make the prognosis 
that the process of integration was a self-reinforcing one, and one with a kind of 
external magnetism. He observed, for instance, already by then significant shifts 
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in the attitude of leading British politicians towards European integration  (Haas, 
313-317). And as we know, a British membership application did then not wait 
for long. 
  
A membership of Arab countries is excluded for some time to come, not the 
least because these countries are not democratic. But provided these countries 
will make a proper transition to democracy, EU membership applications will be 
more likely than not. It will be in the logic of this process. And as I have argued 
at another place, Muslim religion cannot justify a rejection of Turkish 
membership (Zank 2009 c). Neither could it do so in the case of Morocco. 
 
 
Conclusion 
From a cultural point of view, in 1945 the conditions for Arab integration 
seemed to be good, given the point that they had the same language and religion 
and a common experience of Western domination. But for decades it made 
hardly any progress, on the contrary, in the 1960s the Arab world was extremely 
divided. The reasons for this development were multifold. 
  
The construction of independent Arab states created lasting path dependencies 
because thereby also national elites with vested interests in the sovereignty of 
their states were created. Simple rational choice can then explain the weak 
institutions of the Arab League of 1945: Pan-Arab ideology was strong enough 
to make the Arab leaders granting symbolic concessions to this idea, but it could 
not force them to compromise sovereignty. Also their behaviour during the war 
of 1948/49 can mainly be explained in terms of rational choice, the keywords 
being collective action problems under the conditions of lack of trust and 
information (“prisoners’ dilemma”).  
  
The new Arab states turned out to be resilient, but compared with e.g. the 
European countries they had relatively weak institutions. This made them prone 
to military coups. The revolutionary military regimes opted for models of “Arab 
socialism” with large-scale confiscations and dispossessing of traditional elites. 
This opened a deep cleavage between revolutionary and conservative Arab 
countries. In the civil war in Yemen coalitions of Arab states were confronting 
each other directly or indirectly. The strong differences in the political systems 
acted as a serious break on any kind of cooperation. Equally important in the 
long run were presumably the unintended consequences of Arab socialism and 
Import-Substitution Industrialization: Most Arab countries built up high 
protectionist walls against each other. And as it turned out, socialism and import 
substitution were strategies which created stagnant economies and led to 
bankruptcy in most cases. Important from an integration perspective: Erecting 
protectionist borders and, as in some cases, eliminating social groups such as the 
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business community, prevented the development of a dense network of 
transactions and effectively blocked the working of spill-over effects. This way 
in practice very vocal champions of Pan-Arabism such as Nasser in practice 
destroyed the chances for Pan-Arabism – presumably unintended. 
  
Many unification projects of smaller groups of Arab states did not come near to 
realization. They were usually schemes for self-aggrandizement and had 
therefore small changes of acceptance by the proposed junior partner, pan-
Arabist rhetoric not withstanding. The union between Egypt and Syria of 1958 
stands out as an exception. It can be explained by federalist theory, as pioneered 
by William Riker (federation as the outcome of a threat); Syria accepting a 
junior position because Israel was seen as an external threat and a communist 
take-over as an internal one. Pan-Arabist sentiments among the Syrian Baath 
party were a contributing factor for the union. But the union could not be stable 
because Egypt treated Syria as a colony, and because the social systems were 
diverse. Exporting socialism to Syria, by then still rather pluralistic and market-
oriented, provoked heavy resistance. A coup in 1961 ended the union. 
  
Socialism and import-substitution became discredited in the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, reform processes were very slow in most cases (Tunisia being an 
exception in relative terms). The slowness can be explained by the relative 
strength of vested interested in protectionism, which were concentrated, whereas 
the benefits of economic openings were dispersed and often not clearly known. 
Also this development can be seen as path dependency. Ideological factors 
contributed also to slowing down the process of opening. As a consequence 
many Arab countries had non-performing hybrid economies for many years, 
growth rates remained slow. But the last years economic dynamism has returned 
at last. 
  
The gradual turn to open economies made it also possible that for once Arab 
integration gained practical importance with the launch of the project of the 
Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA); it resulted in important tariff 
reductions. However, this has been in so far “shallow integration”, not resulting 
in lifting of non-tariff trade barriers such as product standards, and it did not 
apply to services. A regional initiative, however, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
has been rather successful. In this case similar political regimes could install 
lasting cooperation, mainly in the field of internal security. But they also created 
a customs union and are preparing a monetary union: Important steps at 
economic and also political integration. 
  
As it turned out, for most Arab countries the European countries have been 
much more important economic partners than the Arab neighbours. On the one 
hand, this was due to the size of the EU market. But it was also a result of EU 
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policy which opened the EU marked for Arab products early on whereas Arab 
exports to other Arab countries remained blocked. In the 1990s the EU worked 
actively for the aim of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area and offered upgraded 
assistance to countries which accepted the gradual lowering of the their tariff 
barriers. The first countries to accept this were Morocco and Tunisia, later also 
Jordan and Egypt. These countries launched also the Agadir process, 
establishing free trade among them, more comprehensively than under the 
GAFTA project, and based on EU rules of origin.  
  
With the opening of the Arab economies and the reformation of social groups 
such as the business community we can expect a pressure for more cooperation 
and the development of spill-over effects. Spill-over effects will presumably 
produce closer Arab integration, but they seem to work mainly towards more 
integration with the EU, at least as regards some Arab countries.  
  
When launching the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) the EU offered a 
“stake in the Internal Market” and additional support on the basis of Action 
Plans which were to support human rights and stabilizing open market 
economies. The ENP and “stake in the internal market” brought deep 
integration” with the EU on the agenda, implying not only changes at the border, 
but also “behind the border”. We can expect that EU decisions will become 
increasingly important for the Arab countries. It is therefore likely that they 
increasingly will turn attention to the EU and try to influence EU decisions, by 
dialogue and lobbying. In case one or more Arab countries will become properly 
democratic, applications for EU membership are more likely than not. 
 
 
 33
References 
Barnett, Michael and Etel Solingen (2007), ‘Designed to fail or failure of design? The origins 
and legacy of the Arab League’, Acharya, Amitav and Alastair Iain Johnston, Crafting 
Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Chandra, Bipan and Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee (2008), India Since 
Independence, London, Penguin, revised edition. 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette (2006), Debates on European Integration: A Reader, Houndmills 
and New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Etzioni, Amitai (2001), Political Union Revisited: On Building Super-National Communities, 
Lanham/Maryland, Lexington Books. 
European Central Bank (2004), ‘Economic Integration in selected regions outside the 
European Union’, Monthly Bulletin, October, pp. 67-84. 
Fawzy, Samiha (2003), ‘The Economics and Politics of Arab Economic Integration’, Galal 
and Hoekman, pp. 13-37. 
Femise (2008), Femise Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 2007, Cairo and 
Marseilles, February. 
Femise (2007), Femise Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 2006, Cairo and 
Marseille, http://femise.org/Pub-indic/an-06.html. 
Fri./now. (2008), ‘Schlag gegen illegale Bargeldtransporte’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
22. September, p. 13. 
Galal, Ahmed and Bernard Hoekman (eds.) (2003 a), Arab Economic Integration: Between 
Hope and Reality, Washington. 
Galal, Ahmed and Bernard Hoekman (2003 b), ‘Between Hope and Reality: An Overview of 
Arab Economic Integration’, Galal and Hoekmann (2003 a), pp. 1-12. 
Goldschmidt, Arthur, Jr., (1988), Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State, Boulder, 
Colorado et al., Westview Press and Hutchinson. 
Gomez, Ricardo (2003), Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Strategic Action in 
EU Foreign Policy?, Aldershot and Burlington, Ashgate, 
Haas, Ernst (2004 (1958], The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 
1950-1957, University of Notre Dame Press. 
Hehn, Jochen (2007), ‘Geplante Mittelmeerunion soll nun mit allen EU-Staaten kooperieren’, 
Die Welt, 8. Dezember, p. 5. 
Heller, E. (1981),’Die arabisch-islamische Welt im Aufbruch’, Wolfgang Benz and Hermann 
Graml (eds.), Weltprobleme zwischen den Machtblöcken. Das Zwanzigste Jahrhundert III 
(Fischer Weltgeschichte Band 36), Frankfurt-M., Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. 
Hobsbawm, Eric (1992), Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality, 
second edition, Canto, Cambridge University Press.  
Jünemann, Anette (2005), ‘Zehn Jahre Barcelona-Prozess: Eine gemischte Bilanz’, Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 45, pp. 7-14. 
Kindleberger, Charles (1984), Die Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929-39, München, dtv, 3. edition. 
Kornai, János (1992), The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Socialism, Princeton 
University Press. 
Kramer, M. (1993), ‘Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity’, Daedalus, Summer, pp. 171-206, 
http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/ArabNationalism.htm. 
McKay, David (1999), Federalism and European Union: A Political Economy Perspective, 
Oxford University Press. 
Mattioli, A. (2003), ‘Entgrenzte Kriegsgewalt. Der italienische Giftgaseinsatz in Abessinien 
1935-1936’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 3/2003, pp. 311-37. 
 
 34
Moore, Clement Henry (1984), ‘The Maghrib’, Crowder, Michael (ed.),  The Cambridge 
History of Africa, Volume 8 from c. 1940 to c. 1975, pp. 564-610. 
Murphy, Emma C. (1999), Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to 
Ben Ali, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Nsouli, Saleh M. (2006), ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Ten Years On: Reassessing 
Readiness and Prospects’, International Monetary Fund. 
  http://imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/062306.htm 
Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner (1995), ‘Economic Reform and the Process of Global 
Integration’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 1-118. 
Shlajm, Avi (2001), ‘Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948’, Rogan, Eugene and Avi Shlaim 
(eds.), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, Cambridge University Press, 
pp.79-103. 
Wippel, Steffen (2005), ‘The Agadir Agreement and Open Regionalism’, EuroMesCopaper 
45, Lisbon, September. 
Zank, Wolfgang (2005), ‘The Politics of Eastern Enlargement: Historical Reconstruction and 
Theoretical Conclusions’, European Research Unit, Series of Occasional Papers, 38, 
Aalborg University, 56 pages. 
 http://vbn.aau.dk/fbspretrieve/13907876/38_Zank_2005.pdf 
Zank, Wolfgang (ed.) (2009 a), Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations: Overlapping 
Integration and Identities, Aldershot, Ashgate. 
Zank, Wolfgang (2009 b), ‘The Gradual Europeanization of North Africa: From “Arab 
Socialism” to a “Stake in EU’s Internal Market”’, Zank (2009 a), pp. 109-146. 
Zank, Wolfgang (2009 c), ‘”Enriched by Open Borders and a Lively Variety of Languages, 
Cultures and Regions”: Cooperation and Integration in the EU in spite of Cultural 
Diversity’, Zank (2009 a), pp.183-206. 
Zarrouk, Jamal (2003 a), ‘A Survey of Barriers to Trade and Investment in Arab Countries’, 
Gamal and Hoekman (2003 a), pp. 48-60. 
Zoli, Corri (2008), ‘The Strategic Roots of Arab Federalism and Its Failure: Transnational 
Sovereign Power Issues, Military Rule, and Arab Identity’, Kawalski, Emilian and 
Magdalena Zolkos, Defunct Federalisms. Critical Perspectives on Federal Failure, 
Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 103-114. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
CCIS RESEARCH SERIES 
WORKING PAPERS: 
 
No. 1. Dr. Wolfgang Zank: The Expanding EU: Ever more diversified people become “united ever 
more closely”, 25 pp, 2006. 
   
No. 2. Søren Dosenrode: Federal and European Union Policy Making – A Comparative Perspective, 31 
pp, 2007. 
   
No. 3. Li Xing: East Asian Regional Integration: From Japan-led "Flying-geese" to China-centred 
"Bamboo Capitalism, 23 pp, 2007. 
   
No. 4. Dr. Wolfgang Zank: A Comparative European View on African Integration – Why it has been 
much more difficult in Africa than in Europe, 28 pp, 2007. 
   
No. 5. Steen Fryba Christensen: South American Regional Integration: Two Moments in Mercosur's 
Integration Trajectory, 35 pp, 2007 
   
No.  6 Paul Opoku-Mensah: The African Diaspora, Civil Society and African Integration, 16 pp, 2007. 
   
No. 7 Li Xing & Paul Opoku-Mensah: Diaspora in Development and Integration: The Case of the 
Chinese and African Diaspora, 29 pp, 2008. 
   
No.  8 Søren Dosenrode: On Culture and regional Integration, 23 pp, 2008. 
   
No. 9 Li Xing & Zhang Shengjun: China and Regional Integration in East Asia: Opportunities, 
Constraints and Challenges, 21 pp, 2009. 
   
No.  10 Dr. Wolfgang Zank: The modest Progress of Arab Integration, or why some Arab Countries have 
integrated more with Europe than with their Neighbours, 34 pp, 2009.  
  
